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Abstract  
Following the adoption of information and communication technologies (ICT), firms may react to increasing 
skill requirements either by training or hiring the new skills, or a combination of the two.Using matched datasets 
with about 1,000 French plants, we assess the relative importance of these external and internal labour market 
strategies. We show that skill upgrading following technological and organisational changes takes place mostly 
through internal labour markets adjustments. Consistently with the results in the literature, we find that the 
intensive use of ICT is associated with an upward shift in the occupational structure within firms. We show that 
about one third of the upgrading of the occupational structure is due to hiring and firing workers from and to the 
external labour market, whereas two-thirds are due to promotions. Moreover, we find no compelling evidence of 
external labour market strategies based on "excess turnover". In contrast, French firms heavily rely on training in 
order to upgrade the skill level of their workforce. When looking at potential heterogeneity across firms in skill 
upgrading strategies, we find that all firms rely much more on promotions than on external movements in order 
to shift their occupational structure upward. In contrast, different training patterns are found across sectors: the 
use of ICT is strongly correlated with training for all occupational groups in manufacturing sectors, whereas this 
is not the case in services. This difference is robust to controlling for other sources of heterogeneity and may be 
explained by the fact that labour turnover is much higher in services than in manufacturing. 
Keywords: Technical change; labour turnover; skill bias; training; internal labour markets. 
JEL codes: J23; J24; J41. 
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Introduction 
It has been more than a decade now that the debate in the popular press and in the academic 
literature has suggested that the emergence of the "new economy" has deeply modified firms' 
human resource management practices. These would increasingly rely on the external labour 
market, at the expense of the internal one.  
One alleged reason for this change is that the creation of value-added is increasingly based on 
the recombination of production factors in new ways, rather than on the accumulation of firm-
specific competences (Reich, 2001). Regarding labour, this means that, in many instances, 
freshness becomes more valuable than seniority. This has had several consequences in terms 
of pay and human resource management practices, in particular lower returns to seniority in 
sectors that are intensive in information technologies (DiPrete et al, 2002); greater use of 
contingent work
1
 and alternative employment
2
 relationships in "new-economy jobs" 
(Neumark and Reed, 2004); and greater job insecurity (Givord and Maurin, 2004) and job 
instability (Bauer and Bender, 2004; Askenazy and Moreno-Galbis, 2007) in high-tech firms.  
This literature suggests that, to some extent, new technologies are incompatible with long-
term relationships between the firms and their workers, i.e. with the existence of internal 
labour markets. The question we ask in this paper is: are internal labour markets doomed to 
disappear in the new economy?  
One key aspect of human resource management is the production of new skills within the 
firm. This function has become increasingly important in the new economy because, as is well 
established in the literature, new information and communication technologies (ICT) tend to 
be skill-biased (see Chennells and Van Reenen, 2002, for a review). So, ICT-intensive firms 
face strong incentives to upgrade the skill level of their workforce in order to fully exploit the 
potential productivity gains arising from the new equipment (Caroli and Van Reenen, 2001). 
Do they entirely rely on the external labour market in order to do that or do they also use the 
internal labour market, and to what extent? 
                                                 
1
 Three definitions of contingent workers are used, going from more to less restrictive. The most stringent 
definition is wage and salary workers who expect their job to last 1 year or less and have been in the job for 1 
year or less. The second definition adds in the self-employed and independent contractors for whom both 1-year 
criteria apply. It also adds in workers with temporary help agencies or contract companies for whom both 1-year 
criteria apply to their current assignment. Finally, the least restrictive definition drops the 1-year tenure criterion 
for wage and salary workers. 
2
 Workers are said to be in alternative employment arrangements if they belong to any of the following 
categories: independent contractors (including consultants and freelance workers, and irrespective of whether 
they identify themselves as wage and salary workers or self-employed); on-call workers; temporary help agency 
workers; and workers provided by contract firms. 
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In order to investigate this issue, we build a unique data set providing information on 
technology use, occupations, labour flows and training for a sample of 1,100 French firms in 
the late 1990s. We consider three possible ways for firms to upgrade their skill structure.  
1) They may shift their occupational structure upward, which can be done either by 
promoting incumbent workers from lower to higher skilled occupations (internal 
labour market strategy) or alternatively, by hiring workers in more highly skilled 
occupations and/or firing them in less skilled ones (external labour market strategy). 
2) External labour market adjustments may also take the form of "excess turnover" (or 
churning) – i.e. turnover in excess to what is necessary to upgrade the occupational 
structure – if firms try to acquire new skills by the adjunction of "fresh" workers.  
3) Eventually, firms may train their own workers, thus relying on the internal labour 
market. 
Our empirical findings suggest that ICT-intensive firms largely rely on the internal labour 
market in order to upgrade the skill level of their workforce. We show that the intensive use 
of ICT is associated with an upward shift in the occupational structure within firms. About 
one third of this occupational upgrading is due entries and exits of workers from and to the 
external labour market, whereas two-thirds are due to promotions. We find no compelling 
evidence of external labour market strategies based on "excess turnover". In contrast, French 
firms heavily rely on training in order to upgrade the skill level of their workforce: ICT use is 
positively correlated with a greater access to training and more training hours for all 
categories of workers. This widespread use of internal labour market strategies is robust to 
controlling for potentially confounding factors such as the use of innovative workplace 
practices or industrial relations. When looking at potential heterogeneity across firms in skill 
upgrading strategies, we find that all firms rely much more on promotions than on external 
movements in order to shift their occupational structure upward. In contrast, different training 
patterns are found across sectors: the use of ICT is strongly correlated with training for all 
occupational groups in manufacturing sectors, whereas this is not the case in services. This 
difference is robust to controlling for other sources of heterogeneity and may be explained by 
the fact that labour turnover is much higher in services than in manufacturing.  
Our work closely relates to a number of papers in the literature. Working on U.S. data, 
Neumark and Reed (2004) display a significantly greater use of contingent and "alternative" 
employment relationships in new economy jobs when these jobs are defined as jobs located in 
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cities classified as high-tech and in fast-growing industries. In contrast, they find evidence of 
a lesser use of this type of contracts when new-economy jobs are defined as jobs in high-tech 
industries. Our results are consistent with this in that they suggest that high-tech firms do not 
entirely rely on external turnover in order to upgrade the skill level of their workforce. 
Internal labour market strategies such as promotions and training are important tools used by 
firms to achieve this goal. Askenazy and Moreno-Galbis (2007) focus on France as we do. 
They find that firms that most intensely use new technologies and innovative work practices 
experience a higher turnover among most of the occupational categories. However, the bulk 
of the effect comes from innovative work practices rather than new technologies.
3
 Our results 
suggest that when focusing on ICT and when considering the various skill upgrading 
strategies potentially used by firms, internal labour market strategies come out as dominant, 
for most occupational groups. This is consistent with findings in the training literature. Most 
papers indeed find that the adoption of information technologies raises firms' investment in 
training, which is a typical internal labour market response (see Lynch and Black, 1998; 
Behaghel and Greenan, 2005). 
As underlined by this brief review of the literature, most works consider only one type of 
human resource strategy in relation with ICT adoption. They either study internal or external 
labour market strategies, but rarely both at the same time
4
. This is problematic as internal and 
external labour market strategies are likely to coexist, the key issue being their relative weight 
and whether they act as complements or substitutes (see Mincer, 1989). The main 
contribution of this paper is to develop and implement a simple statistical framework to 
systematically assess the relative importance of internal and external labour markets, in a 
context of technical change. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 1 outlines the econometric model. Section 2 
introduces the data. The results are presented in Section 3 and some discussion and 
concluding remarks are offered in Section 4. 
 
                                                 
3
 One exception is the positive correlation between the use of the Intranet and churning for manual workers. We 
find a similar result when taking into account the potential role of firm size, labour market density and sector. In 
this case, a greater use of ICT is associated with higher excess turnover for blue-collars at least in the 
manufacturing sector. 
4
 An exception is Bauer and Bender (2004) – see Section 4. for a more detailed discussion of their results. 
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1. The Econometric model 
New technologies and skill upgrading 
The existing literature on skill-biased technical change suggests that in order to fully exploit 
the potential of ICT, firms have to upgrade the skill level of their workforce when adopting 
them. The corresponding prediction is that there should be a positive correlation (all other 
things kept equal) between the use of more advanced technologies and an increase in the skill 
level of the workforce.  
A very simple test is based on the following regression: 
iiii ICTzSKILL εδ∆β∆ ++=      (1) 
where ∆ICT is an indicator of adoption of new information and communication technologies, 
SKILL is a measure of the workforce’s skills, and z are control variables.  
ICT adoption is likely to be endogenous. In the absence of any good instrument for 
technological adoption, we interpret positive estimates δˆ  as evidence of partial correlations 
between the adoption of new technologies and upward changes in the skill structure of the 
workforce – see Section 4. for further discussion of endogeneity issues.  
Skills, however, can be acquired through a variety of channels. In what follows, we consider 
three possible channels: firms may upgrade the occupational structure of their workforce 
(which can be achieved though entries and exits or, alternatively through promotions); they 
may rely on excess turnover in order to acquire fresh skills; and/or, they may train their own 
workers. We interpret upward changes in the occupational structure through entries and exits 
as well as excess turnover as indicators of external labour market adjustments. Conversely, 
skill upgrading through promotions and training are seen as indicators of internal labour 
market strategies. 
 
Decomposing changes in the occupational structure 
Changes in firms' occupational structure in relation with ICT adoption are usually estimated 
using standard labour share equations:  
ipipiip ICTxS εδ∆β∆ ++=      (2) 
where Sip is the share of occupational group p in the workforce of firm i:  
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Such changes are the outcome of two different movements: (i) entries and exits of workers at 
various levels of the occupational structure and (ii) promotions of workers from lower to 
higher occupations. In order to distinguish both effects, we construct counterfactual changes 
in labour shares ( ipS
~∆ ) describing what would have happened to the occupational structure if 
there had only been entries and exits at the different occupational levels, but no internal 
movement (promotion or demotion):  
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where iptL 1−  is number of workers in occupation p in firm i at time t-1, 
ip
tH  is the number of 
entries in occupation p in firm i between time t-1 and t and iptE  is the number of workers 
formerly employed in occupation p leaving firm i between time t-1 and t. Similarly, itL , 
i
tH , 
and itE  respectively denote the total number of workers, entries and exits in firm i at time t.  
Given that we do not have any direct information on promotions, changes in the occupational 
structure through promotions only ( ipSˆ∆ ) are defined as the changes in the occupational 
structure that would have occurred if there had been none of the entries or exits that we 
observe in the data:  
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where iptL  is the number of workers in occupation p in firm i at time t. The number of workers 
in occupation p at t is computed as a counterfactual including only promotions, i.e. the 
number of workers observed at t in occupation p minus entries plus exits into that group 
between t-1 and t. In other words, it includes all people that would have been in occupation p 
at date t if there had been only promotions and no entries nor exits at this level between t-1 
and t. The corresponding labour share is computed by dividing this number of workers by 
what employment would have been in the firm at year t if no entry nor exit had taken place 
over the period.  
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In the case where the total level of employment is constant, the observed changes are the sum 
of the two counterfactual changes. Indeed, we then have it
i
t EH =  and 
i
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We then estimate equation (2) separately for ipS
~∆  and ipSˆ∆  by OLS, equation by equation.5,6 
 
Upgrading skills through excess turnover and training 
Another way to upgrade the skill structure of a firm when adopting ICT is through the 
addition of "fresh" workers by means of labour turnover. Turnover is, to some extent, a 
mechanical consequence of the upgrading of the occupational structure through entries/exits: 
there cannot be any upgrading of the occupational structure through entries/exits if there are 
no worker flows. However, as is well known from the literature on job and worker flows (for 
French firms, see Abowd, Corbel and Kramarz, 2003), worker flows (turnover) usually 
largely exceed what is needed for a given level of job flows. We therefore use a measure of 
‘excess turnover’ – or churning -, i.e. turnover in excess to what is needed for a given change 
in the size of a group of workers. Specifically, excess turnover et in plant i and for group p is 
defined as: 
ip
ipip
ip
ipip
ip
L
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−
−
+
≡     (5) 
We then estimate: 
ippipiip vICTxet ++= γ∆ξ     (6) 
by OLS equation by equation. pγˆ is the estimate of interest; positive values indicate that ICT 
adoption is associated with an increased turnover of group p, beyond what is mechanically 
implied by the upgrading of occupational groups. 
Similarly, skill upgrading through training needs to be analysed within each occupational 
group. Indeed, training rates are higher in high-skill groups, hence upgrading of the 
                                                 
5
 Although we are estimating a system of Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR), feasible Generalized Least 
Squares (FGLS) are not warranted here, as the same regressors show up in each equation (see, e.g., Theorem 7.6 
in Wooldridge, 2002). 
6
 Note that the coefficients we obtain for ipSˆ∆  and ipS
~∆ need not add up to those obtained when using ipS∆ as 
a dependent variable: this is due to the effect that the decomposition is perfect only when total employment is 
constant. However, in practice, the estimated coefficients are not far to add up. 
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occupational structure through entries/exits mechanically generates an increase in training 
rates. Our data allows us to estimate training equations for a given occupational group: 
ippipiip ICTxT υη∆ψ ++=     (7) 
which we estimate by OLS. pηˆ  is the estimate of interest; positive values indicate that ICT 
adoption is associated with an increase in training, once controlled for composition effects. 
 
2. The Data 
Measuring technology adoption and skill upgrading through our 3 channels at the firm level 
requires combining several databases.  
Information on ICT comes from the REPONSE survey (RElations PrOfessionnelles et 
NégocationS d’Entreprise). In 1998, 2978 establishments were surveyed with senior managers 
being asked questions about industrial relations, implementation of new technologies and 
reorganizations
7
. Regarding ICT, we have information on the proportion of workers using the 
Intranet
8
 and the Internet in 1998 (no use, less than 5%, 5 to 19%, 20 to 49%, 50% and more). 
Given that these technologies were at the very beginning of their life cycle in France in the 
mid-1990s, we assume that the proportion of workers using them in 1998 provides a good 
approximation of technological adoption over 1996-1998. More specifically, we define a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if at least 5% of the workers use the Internet or at least 20% of the 
workers use the Intranet
9
. One advantage of this simple measure of ITC use is that it is 
relevant for the different sectors in the economy: as shown by table A1, in our sample, very 
similar proportions of firms in the manufacturing and service sectors are classified as “ICT-
intensive” by this measure (about one third). Moreover, using another survey of French 
manufacturing firms, Greenan and Mairesse (2006) show that the use of the Internet (as 
measured in 1997) is highly correlated with a variety of other measures of technical change. 
The REPONSE survey also provides detailed information on firms and establishments which 
we use as control variables in the regressions: firm characteristics (public/private, firm with 
one or several plants, listed on stock markets/non-listed), plant characteristics (share of 
women, share of part-time workers, presence of union delegates, local labour market density), 
                                                 
7
 The REPONSE survey was conducted in 1992, 1998 and 2005. Panels that result from the merging of the three 
waves contain few observations and therefore can not be used. Moreover, one of the databases used in this paper 
(ESE) is not available from 1999 onward. 
8
 The exact phrasing is "Intranet and computer networks". 
9
 We check that our results are robust to changes in these thresholds – see Section 3.a below. 
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as well as a set of industry and plant size dummies. We also have information on the use of 
innovative workplace practices and the quality of industrial relations (percentage of workers 
involved in quality circles, number of organisational devices used to stimulate workers' 
participation
10
, whether there has been a strike in the past 3 years). We use them as additional 
controls in some specifications.  
In order to capture worker flows, we rely on two different sources. The DMMO (Données sur 
les Mouvements de Main-d’Oeuvre) has exhaustive data on entries and exits of workers in 
and out of establishments with 50 employees or more. The data is broken down into four 
occupational categories: managers and professionals
11
, technicians and supervisors, clerks and 
blue collars.
12
 The EMMO (Enquête sur les Mouvements de Main-d’Oeuvre) has identical 
information on a representative sample of firms with less than 50 employees. We use this data 
to compute counterfactual changes in labour shares over 1996-1998, i.e. changes that are due 
only to entries and exits (resp. promotions) in the various occupations over the period. In 
order to do so – see equations (3) and (4) – we also use information on the level of 
employment in each occupational cell at the beginning and at the end of the period. This 
information is provided by the French survey of employment structure: the ESE (Enquête 
Structure des Emplois), as of December 31
st 
1995 and 1998. 
The last channel we consider for skill upgrading is training. The so-called “24-83” fiscal 
records provide firm-level data on the number of workers receiving training and the volume 
of training hours
13
. This information is broken down into four occupational categories which 
are identical to those in the DMMO-EMMO database. For each occupation, we thus compute 
both the proportion of workers receiving some training and the average number of training 
hours per worker. These are averaged over 1996-1998 in order to account for the fact that 
training may take some time to be implemented after firms decide to invest in it.  
Matching the five datasets and cleaning out establishments with implausible values for skill 
upgrading reduces our sample to 1,114 establishments. The low matching rate is primarily 
                                                 
10
 The devices that are considered are: existence of a suggestion box, a firm's newspaper, a visiting day, a firm's 
project or a quality action. The stimulation of workers' participation is considered to be strong if the 
establishment uses more than 3 of those devices.  
11
 This category also includes engineers.  
12
 In principle, the data allows to distinguish between skilled and unskilled blue-collars. We systematically ran 
the analysis with this distinction. The general picture remained unchanged (with some additional, expected shifts 
toward more skilled blue collars in ITC-intensive firms). However, we found evidence suggesting that, in some 
cases, training data reported by firms were incorrectly attributed to one category instead of the other, and 
therefore we chose to group all blue-collars together. 
13
 The "24-83" records provide firm rather than plant-level data on training. Matching them with establishment-
level data generates some measurement error that is likely to raise the standard errors in our estimates. 
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due to the fact that the EMMO and 24-83 sources are not exhaustive (respectively, not 
systematically coded) – see the Data Appendix for details.  
Table A1 summarizes all the variables used in our models. Our sample consists mainly of 
large plants (53% have more than 200 workers) belonging to multi-establishment firms of the 
private sector. 77% have a union delegate and less than half of them are listed. The 
manufacturing sector is over-represented in our sample: it accounts for 80% of total 
employment, compared to only 20% in the whole French economy. As a consequence, 
women account for only 35% of the labour force. 37% of the plants employ more than 5% of 
part-time workers, 28% have more than one fifth of their workers involved in quality circles, 
and 35% strongly stimulate workers' participation. Lastly, 35% of the plants have experienced 
at least one strike in the three-year period covered by the survey.  
Over 1996-1998, occupational changes have been substantial in our sample. The proportion of 
managers and professionals has increased on average in all plants, but the rise has been more 
important in establishments that have introduced ICT. The share of technicians and 
supervisors has also increased, especially in manufacturing plants. In contrast the share of 
clerks and blue-collars has decreased. This is particularly the case in establishments that have 
adopted information technologies. Finally, the reduction in the share of clerks has been much 
stronger in services than in manufacturing, while the opposite holds for blue-collars. Much of 
these changes seem to be due to internal movements of the labour force. Consistently, training 
appears to be frequent, although access is greater for more skilled occupations. In what 
follows, we use regression analysis in order to further investigate these changes.  
 
3. Results 
3.a ICT adoption and skill upgrading strategies 
We first investigate the correlation between ICT adoption and the strategies used by firms to 
upgrade the skills of their workforce. Table 1 presents the results for the three different forms 
of skill upgrading we consider here: upward shift in the occupational structure through 
entries/exits versus promotions, excess turnover and training.  
Panel A of Table 1 provides evidence of skill-biased technical change. The use of the Internet 
or the Intranet is positively correlated with an upward shift in the occupational structure and, 
more specifically with an increase in the proportion of managers, engineers and professionals 
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and a decrease in the proportion of clerks in the workforce. This occupational upgrading is 
essentially achieved through internal movements (promotions). These account for more than 
70% of the increase in the proportion of managers – as compared to only 30% for external 
movements - and for almost all of the reduction in the share of clerks – see Panels B and C. 
This first set of results suggests that internal labour markets still play an important role when 
firms have to cope with increasing skill requirements. Most of the adjustment in the 
occupational structure takes place through promotions, whereas the relative importance of 
entries and exits to and from the external labour market remains limited. To gauge the 
economic significance of the effects, it is useful to compare them to the average changes in 
the occupational structure in our sample during the 1996-1998 period (Table A.1). For 
instance, the .80 percentage point increase in the share of managers and professionals 
occurring through internal movements and associated with intensive ICT-use (Table 1) is very 
close to the overall increase in the share of managers and professionals in the economy (+.77 
percentage points). If we were to give a causal interpretation to the estimates, a back-of-the-
envelop calculation would imply that about 35% of the overall increase in the demand for 
managers and professionals is due to the adoption of ICT that occurred in about 1/3 of firms 
over the period and which was satisfied through internal movements (0.33*.80/0.77=0.34); 
about 15% is due to the adoption of ICT but was satisfied by the external labour market 
(.33*.3/0.77=.13); and the remaining 50% is due to other causes. Of course, our estimates 
cannot necessarily be interpreted causally; but this suggests that the role of internal labour 
markets is far from negligible in the overall upgrading of the occupational structure.  
However, firms may also try to upgrade the skill level of their workforce by bringing in "fresh 
workers" with new skills, beyond what would be necessary to upgrade the occupational 
structure through entries and exits. Panel D of Table 1 thus investigates the partial 
correlations between ICT adoption and excess turnover. We find no compelling evidence of 
such a correlation: the use of the Internet or the Intranet is not associated with excess 
turnover, whatever the category of workers we consider. Overall, the external labour market 
does not appear as a key provider of new skills when firms introduce new information and 
communication technologies.   
In contrast, firms heavily rely on training in order to upgrade the skill level of their workforce. 
Panels E and F of Table 1 have the partial correlations between ICT adoption on the one hand 
and two different measures of training on the other hand. As evidenced by Panel E, the 
introduction of new technologies is correlated with a greater access to training for all 
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categories of workers except for managers and professionals - where the coefficient is positive 
but not statistically significant. In contrast, when considering the number of hours of training 
per worker, the correlation is positive and significant for all occupational groups, including 
managers. Again, it is useful to compare the effects to the average level of training in the 
sample displayed in Table A.1. Depending on the occupation, ICT adoption is associated with 
an increase in the incidence of training by 5 to 15%, and an increase in training hours by 10 to 
15%. This strong association between training and ICT is slightly weaker when controlling 
for past levels of training but it remains significant for most occupations except blue-collar 
workers – see Table A2 – Panel 1. Although this specification permits to better control for 
unobserved heterogeneity in training investments, it is not our preferred one because it boils 
down to investigating the correlation between the adoption of ICT and the acceleration – 
rather than the change – in the skill level within firms. Training is indeed a flow that 
contributes to raise the skill level of workers, so that the change in training over time is 
nothing else than the change in the change in the skill level of workers, which is far from 
being easily interpretable.  
Overall, our results suggest that the internal labour market still plays a key role in the 
adjustment of the skill level of the workforce in firms that intensely use new information and 
communication technologies. In order to check the robustness of these findings, we re-run our 
basic set of regressions, using alternative thresholds for ICT adoption (see Appendix Table 
A3). The general pattern of results is virtually unchanged: promotions account for the largest 
part of the upgrading in the occupational structure, and training is used as a complementary 
strategy to raise the skill level of workers in all occupations. 
One may also be concerned that our results are driven by some differences in firms' 
characteristics that are likely to be correlated with ICT adoption. This is particularly likely to 
be the case for innovative workplace practices because they tend to be complementary with 
information technologies (see Bresnahan et al, 2002). This could also be the case for 
industrial relations if firms with more peaceful relations are both more willing to have internal 
labour markets and better equipped to introduce ICT. Table 2 presents the results when 
controlling for these possibly confounding factors. Specifically, we re-run our basic set of 
regressions adding a dummy variable for the use of quality circles (more than one fifth of the 
workforce involved), strong stimulation of workers' participation (more than 3 organisational 
devices used) and for strikes. Interestingly, external mobility does not seem to be a response 
to strikes (the correlation between strikes and excess turnover is even negative for most 
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occupational groups and significant for technicians and clerks at the 10% level). In contrast, 
strikes appear to be positively correlated with training, with significant effects for the number 
of training hours provided to blue-collars and (to a lesser extent) technicians. Unsurprisingly, 
the use of organisational devices aiming at stimulating workers' participation appears to be 
positively correlated with the provision of training, thus suggesting that firms that count more 
on their workers also choose to invest in them. However, despite these effects, the correlation 
between ICT adoption and the various skill upgrading strategies remains unchanged, 
suggesting that it is not entirely driven by differences in firms' organisation and/or industrial 
relations.  
The important role of the internal labour market in upgrading the skill level of the workforce 
therefore seems to be quite resistant in France, even in the context of development of the new 
economy. One can wonder however whether this form of human resource management is to 
be found in all firms or whether there is some heterogeneity in firms' strategies and along 
which dimensions. 
 
3.b Heterogeneity in firms' skill upgrading strategies 
A first potential dimension of heterogeneity in our data has to do with industry. Skill 
upgrading practices are likely to be different across sectors, if anything because the needs and 
the relative cost of each strategy are likely to be different. Given the fact that our sample over-
represents the manufacturing sector, our results may not be representative of the average trend 
in the French economy. A disaggregated analysis is therefore needed.  
When splitting our sample across manufacturing and services, our results suggest that there 
are indeed some differences, in particular with respect to the use of training. Table 3.1 
suggests that ICT-intensive firms in the manufacturing sector heavily rely on promotions in 
order to upgrade the skill level of their workforce. Excess turnover is used to a limited extent 
for clerks and blue-collars. But the dominant strategy is based on training with ICT-intensive 
firms providing significantly more training than others to all categories of workers. Regarding 
services (see Table 3.2), the same pattern is observed for changes in the occupational structure 
with promotions accounting for most of the skill upgrading. In contrast, firms in the service 
sectors appear to rely less on training when using ICT, the only significant correlation being 
for blue-collars. These differences in training patterns are robust to controlling for past levels 
of training (see Table A.2 – Panels 2 and 3).  
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This heterogeneity in skill upgrading strategies across sectors is, to a large extent, robust to 
taking into account other potential sources of heterogeneity (see Table 4). The skill upgrading 
strategies chosen by firms are likely to vary according a variety of dimensions. In particular, 
one would expect internal labour markets to be larger and better organised in large firms than 
in smaller ones. In contrast, the external labour market is potentially more attractive in high-
density local labour markets because it is likely to offer a greater variety of skills. Eventually, 
skill upgrading strategies may be different between high and low-tech sectors
14
 because the 
use of the Internet/Intranet is likely to be different in both types of industries. 
Our results suggest that there is indeed some heterogeneity across several of these 
dimensions. The direct effects of the size and local labour market density variables suggest 
that these affect to a certain extent firm's skill upgrading strategies. Large firms essentially 
rely on promotions to upgrade the occupational structure of their workforce (in favour of 
technicians and supervisors and, to a lesser extent at the expense of clerks) and they rely less 
on excess turnover for both categories. More importantly, training is strongly correlated with 
size with large firms providing greater access and more training hours to all categories of 
workers. Interestingly, being located on a high-density local labour market is correlated with a 
lower turnover for technicians and clerks, which is not in line with the idea that high density 
on the local labour market should make external skill upgrading strategies more attractive to 
firms. Eventually, belonging to a high-tech sector does not seem to be strongly associated 
with firms' skill strategies. The only exception is that the high-tech variable is negatively 
correlated with excess turnover for blue-collars and positively correlated with the number of 
training hours for clerks (at the 10% level). 
Moreover, the correlation between ICT adoption and skill upgrading strategies is sometimes 
quite different across firm size, type of local labour market and technological level of the 
sector. This is the message conveyed by the coefficients we get on the interaction terms 
between Internet/Intranet and our control variables. The density of the local labour market 
tends to increase the reliance of ICT-intensive firms upon promotion, in particular for 
managers and blue-collars (at the 10% significance level), contrary to what could be 
expected.
15
 However, it also increases firms' reliance on excess turnover for technicians and 
                                                 
14
 Sectors are classified as being low or high-tech on the basis of the latest OECD 4-digit classification for 
manufacturing sectors (see Hatzichronoglou, 1997) and on the basis of the 4-digit classification proposed by the 
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions for service sectors (see European 
Monitoring Center on Change, 2006). 
15
 A tentative explanation could be that, if in dense local labour markets, firms are able to hire workers that 
match their needs more closely; these successful “matches” are then more likely to lead to promotions. 
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clerks when adopting ICT, which is consistent with the idea that denser labour markets offer a 
wider choice of skills and are thus likely to better fit firms' needs. In contrast, skill upgrading 
strategies associated with the use of ICT do not seem to be very heterogeneous across firm 
size, except for promotions which tend to be relatively more important for clerks and less so 
for technicians (at the 10% level). Similarly, being in high rather than low-tech sectors does 
not massively affect the skill upgrading strategies of ICT-intensive firms. One exception 
however, is that the latter provide more training hours (at the 10% level) to technicians and 
blue-collars in high-tech sectors. 
The differences between manufacturing and services are essentially robust to the introduction 
of these additional controls. The increase in the share of managers and technicians is smaller 
in ICT-intensive service firms than in ITC-intensive manufacturing firms, but there is no 
difference in the respective roles of promotions versus external movements in achieving these 
changes. One important difference which was not striking when splitting the sample across 
sectors is that labour turnover is much higher in services than in manufacturing for all 
categories of workers. The specificity of services with respect to training is confirmed: ICT-
intensive firms rely less on training for all categories of workers, with the coefficients being 
significant for managers and, to a lesser extent, for blue-collars (when considering training 
hours). One reason for this may well be the high level of turnover. If the type of training 
required when firms adopt ICT is more costly than usual, it may well be the case that service 
firms are more reluctant to train their workers given their higher probability to leave than in 
the manufacturing sector. 
Overall, our results highlight some heterogeneity in the skill upgrading strategies of firms that 
have adopted ICT. Firms located in dense labour markets have mixed strategies in order to 
improve the skill level of their workforce: they use both promotions and excess turnover. 
Service firms tend to rely slightly less on training whereas the opposite goes for firms in high-
tech sectors. Nonetheless, the message conveyed by our results is that the reliance on internal 
labour markets remains quite widespread in France even in firms that have adopted new 
information and communication technologies. 
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4. Discussion 
In this paper, we have taken a fresh look at the fate of internal labour markets in the new 
economy. Our results suggest that they vividly resist in France even in firms that have 
introduced information and communication technologies.  
As already evidenced by many papers in the literature, ICT adoption is associated with an 
upward shift in firm's occupational structure. But, in France, this is largely achieved through 
promotions rather than entries and exits from and to the external labour market. Moreover, 
when introducing new technologies, firms massively rely on training in order to upgrade the 
skill level of their workforce, whereas the use of excess turnover as a provider of new skills 
remains very limited. This resistance of internal labour markets even where ICT are intensely 
used is widespread across firms, whatever their size or technological level. It is slightly 
stronger in low-density labour markets and in manufacturing where training is more 
frequently used than in services to increase the skill level of workers.  
We need to insist upon the fact that our estimates do not prove a causal relationship: although 
we introduce a rich set of controls to rule out some of the most likely sources of spurious 
correlations, the ICT variable remains potentially endogenous and we are not able to exhibit 
plausible instruments to solve that problem.
16
 It is therefore important to distinguish between 
two possible interpretations of the results – a conservative one and a more daring one. The 
conservative reading of the results is simply that the intensive use of ICT does not preclude 
human resource management strategies based on internal labour markets: internal labour 
markets and ICT can coexist. This does not make any substantive statement on the causal 
impact of ICT on internal labour markets. Rather, whatever this impact, it has not been 
sufficient to cause the end of internal labour markets. 
More boldly, we believe that our results make a large negative impact of ICT on internal 
labour markets rather unlikely. Indeed, reconciling a large negative causal impact with our 
finding of a robust, positive correlation would require that some unobserved variables create a 
large upward bias in our estimates. Let us consider two types of mechanisms that could 
generate such a bias, and examine whether they are consistent with the evidence we provide. 
                                                 
16
 Note that the instrument would need to be uncorrelated with human resource management practices, which is a 
strong requirement. Even relatively exogenous sources of technology adoption that have been put forward in the 
literature, such as immigration shocks (Lewis, 2005), would not be valid instruments here as they are likely to 
directly impact human resource management practices.  
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The first mechanism is one of spurious correlations due to unobserved shocks at the firm 
level. A first possibility would be that firms that are hit by unfavourable shocks (say, a falling 
demand for their product) have to cut costs. To that end, they adopt cost saving technologies; 
they also downsize, and the burden of the adjustment is disproportionately born by the 
unskilled. This sequence of events would generate a spurious correlation between ICT and 
upgrading of the occupational structure through entries and exits. Therefore, wrongly ignoring 
the potential role of unobserved shocks would make us overestimate the external labour 
market response to ICT adoption. This rather reinforces our result on the predominance of 
internal adjustments. However, unobserved shocks may also work the other way round. Firms 
that are hit by a positive shock may introduce new technologies (because they have more cash 
available for investment). They may also mechanically increase their training investment: The 
French regulation on the financing of continuous training is such that over the 1996-1998 
period, all firms had to spend at least 1.5% of their wage bill on training. For the firms for 
which this constraint is binding, any positive shock that raises the wage bill will mechanically 
generate an increase in training expenditure. In this case, the positive correlation we find 
between new technologies and training may be spurious. In order to check whether this is the 
case, we re-ran our training regressions on the sub-sample of firms spending more than 2% of 
their wage bill on training. For these firms, the legal minimum is not binding so there is no 
reason that an increase in their wage bill should lead them to invest more in training. When 
doing this, our results are virtually unchanged
17
. Another way to control for positive shocks in 
our regressions is to introduce changes in firm's size over 1996-1998 as a control variable. 
Here again, the correlations between ICT and training are unchanged
18
. Of course, one can 
imagine other sources of unobserved heterogeneity that would drive the results spuriously. 
Bloom et al. (2008) suggest that the origin of capital could be one of them. They show that 
US multinationals operating in Europe are more IT-intensive than non-US multinationals (and 
get a higher productivity from IT) and that their IT advantage is primarily due to more 
efficient human resource management practices. In order to make sure that our correlation 
                                                 
17
 The coefficients (standard errors) of the Internet/Intranet variable in the regression for the proportion of 
trainees are: 4.15 (2.18) for managers and professionals, 8.61 (3.83) for technicians and supervisors, 4.87 (2.39) 
for clerks and 3.72 (2.97) and for blue-collars. The coefficients (standard errors) of the Internet/Intranet variable 
in the regression for the intensity of training are: 2.38 (1.13) for managers and professionals, 3.09 (1.11) for 
technicians and supervisors, 1.77 (0.95) for clerks and 2.45 (0.92) for blue-collars. 
18
 The coefficients (standard errors) of the Internet/Intranet variable in the regression for the proportion of 
trainees are: 3.28 (2.07) for managers and professionals, 7.06 (3.03) for technicians and supervisors, 5.49 (1.94) 
for clerks and 3.69 (2.19) and for blue-collars. The coefficients (standard errors) of the Internet/Intranet variable 
in the regression for the intensity of training are: 2.87 (0.97) for managers and professionals, 3.23 (0.93) for 
technicians and supervisors, 2.07 (0.75) for clerks and 2.30 (0.71) for blue-collars. 
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between IT and internal labour market strategies is not driven by US-owned firms, we 
controlled for the origin of capital (US versus non-US) in our baseline regression. The results 
are left unchanged. Of course, this does not rule out other possible sources of unobserved 
heterogeneity. This is why we remain cautious in interpreting our results.  
The second mechanism is related to a policy change that took place in France in the mid 
1990s. Starting in 1993, successive governments have introduced fiscal measures to reduce 
the labour cost of low-wage workers. These payroll tax cuts have had the largest impact on 
firms employing a high proportion of low-skill workers. As a result, these firms were less 
induced to adopt new technologies (as long as they are substitutes to unskilled labour) while 
they had incentives to hire even more low-skill workers. Again, this would lead us to 
overestimate the impact of ICT adoption on external adjustments: the share of low-skill 
workers would increase through entries and exits in firms less prone to adopt ICT. The impact 
of the payroll taxes on internal adjustments is unclear. Low-wage firms might refrain from 
promoting and training their workers, by fear of increasing wages above the level eligible for 
the tax exemption. This, however, does not concern high-wage workers whose training 
appears to be highly correlated with new technologies in our data. Moreover, the additional 
contingents of low-wage workers paid at the minimum wage would probably not get much 
wage increase following training, given that their productivity would, most probably, remain 
below the minimum wage. Overall, it is unclear whether the payroll tax cuts should have 
induced lower training and fewer promotions in firms less likely to adopt ICT. Therefore, it is 
unclear why our finding of a positive correlation between ICT and internal labour market 
strategies should be driven by this policy change. 
Overall, we view our results as providing evidence that internal labour markets have remained 
a viable human resource management strategy for French firms even when adopting new 
information and communication technologies. The negative impact of ICT, if any, has 
remained limited, or has been overcome by other factors. 
This result is in contrast with Bauer and Bender's (2004) who also consider internal and 
external labour market strategies contemporaneously. Using German data, they find that new 
technologies increase churning rates for skilled and highly skilled workers and that most of 
the employment adjustment patterns associated with technological change are due to hiring 
and firing rather than to promotions or demotions. This suggests that firms' human resource 
strategies following ICT adoption may be quite different from one country to the other. As a 
matter of fact, this gap in behaviour between French and German firms is consistent with the 
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national labour market patterns described by Marsden (1999): France is characterised by 
widespread internal labour markets whereas in Germany, occupational labour markets are 
dominant, in particular for skilled workers. They are based on the certification of professional 
skills offered by the apprenticeship system. This allows firm to get reliable information on 
workers' skills before hiring them on the external labour market. By the same token, skilled 
workers are confident that if changing firm, their skills will be recognised in terms of pay and 
employment prospects. In such a system, it is not surprising that firms rely on external skill 
upgrading strategies when adopting new technologies. In France, the system of certification of 
professional skills is by far less developed so that firms face more uncertainty when hiring 
skilled workers on the external labour market. This may be one explanation for the fact that 
they rely much more on training and promotions than their German counterparts.  
Where do we go from here? Another reason why internal labour markets have resisted in 
France, even in the context of development of a new economy, may be the existence of a 
protective employment protection legislation (see OECD, 2004): firms may rely on internal 
labour market adjustments because going on the external labour market would simply be too 
costly. This idea has long been put forward by Bishop (1991). However, recent evidence by 
Bassanini et al. (2007) suggests that the amount of training provided by firms would actually 
be negatively correlated to employment protection legislation. In order to get a better 
understanding of these relations, the direct comparison of France with other countries would 
be potentially very fruitful. The USA or the UK stand as particularly good candidates given 
that employment protection legislation is much less strict in these countries than in France. 
This would permit to check whether the introduction of new technologies has had a different 
impact on firms' labour market strategies in these countries. It would also permit to compare 
the various determinants of skill upgrading strategies across countries. An important avenue 
for future research is indeed to tie down the extent to which labour market institutions are 
likely to affect firms' strategies in terms of human resource management. 
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Table 1   
ICT Adoption and Skill Upgrading Channels 
 
Managers and 
professionals
Technicians and 
supervisors Clerks Blue collars
Internet/Intranet 1,13*** -0,12 -0,65** -0,36
(0,22) (0,30) (0,30) (0,34)
Obs 1 114 1 114 1 114 1 114
Internet/Intranet 0,80*** 0,12 -0,58* -0,34
(0,20) (0,31) (0,30) (0,32)
Obs 1 114 1 114 1 114 1 114
Internet/Intranet 0,30* -0,26 -0,04 0,00
(0,17) (0,22) (0,20) (0,25)
Obs 1 114 1 114 1 114 1 114
Internet/Intranet 1,18 3,15 9,52 -7,70
(1,98) (2,56) (6,89) (13,82)
Obs 1 090 1 094 1 104 1 046
Internet/Intranet 3,40 7,43** 5,50*** 3,81*
(2,06) (3,14) (1,93) (2,31)
Obs 1 097 1 052 1 087 909
Internet/Intranet 3,04*** 3,31*** 2,06*** 2,24***
(0,98) (0,93) (0,76) (0,72)
Obs 1 095 1 042 1 083 907
D. Excess turnover
E. Number of trainees (per 100 workers)
F. Training hours per worker
A. Overall changes in the occupational structure
B. Internal movements
C. External movements
 
Notes:      
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses 
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
(3) A separate OLS regression is run in each panel and for each occupational category. Each 
regression includes controls for plant size (dummy variable for plants with more than 200 
employees), being located on a labour market whose density is higher than the median, multi-
establishment firms, public sector companies, listed companies, presence of union delegates, 
share of women in the labour force, part-time work (dummy variable for firms with more than 
5% of workers being part-time) and 15 sectors. 
Table 2   
ICT Adoption, Work Organisation, Industrial Relations 
and Skill Upgrading Channels 
 
 
Managers and 
professionals
Technicians and 
supervisors Clerks Blue collars
Internet/Intranet 1,11*** -0,11 -0,59** -0,41
(0,23) (0,31) (0,30) (0,33)
>20% Quality circles -0,23 0,17 0,07 -0,01
(0,22) (0,29) (0,27) (0,31)
Strongly stimulates workers' participation 0,26 -0,37 -0,04 0,14
(0,20) (0,28) (0,28) (0,32)
Strike in 96-98 0,08 -0,16 -0,26 0,35
(0,21) (0,28) (0,25) (0,34)
Obs 1 087 1 087 1 087 1 087
Internet/Intranet 0,78*** 0,14 -0,52* -0,40
(0,21) (0,33) (0,30) (0,31)
>20% Quality circles -0,27 0,05 0,34 -0,12
(0,22) (0,31) (0,28) (0,30)
Strongly stimulates workers' participation 0,30 0,00 -0,11 -0,20
(0,21) (0,32) (0,29) (0,31)
Strike in 96-98 -0,10 -0,20 -0,18 0,49
(0,20) (0,29) (0,28) (0,30)
Obs 1 087 1 087 1 087 1 087
Internet/Intranet 0,31* -0,27 -0,05 0,01
(0,17) (0,23) (0,20) (0,25)
>20% Quality circles 0,02 0,18 -0,19 0,00
(0,15) (0,21) (0,19) (0,25)
Strongly stimulates workers' participation 0,00 -0,39* 0,06 0,33
(0,15) (0,21) (0,20) (0,24)
Strike in 96-98 0,16 -0,03 -0,07 -0,06
(0,16) (0,21) (0,19) (0,27)
Obs 1 087 1 087 1 087 1 087
A. Overall changes in the occupational structure
B. Internal movements
C. External movements
 
 
(…) 
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Table 2 - follow 
 
 
Managers and 
professionals
Technicians and 
supervisors Clerks Blue collars
 
Internet/Intranet 1,22 2,55 8,49 -10,74
(2,10) (2,90) (6,86) (16,26)
>20% Quality circles -5,79** 7,58 -6,43 -27,69
(2,84) (5,81) (7,34) (19,02)
Strongly stimulates workers' participation 4,95 4,20 11,80 38,54
(3,59) (6,02) (10,90) (31,49)
Strike in 96-98 -1,62 -6,18* -13,33* -21,03
(2,39) (3,48) (7,41) (17,97)
Obs 1 063 1 068 1 077 1 019
Internet/Intranet 2,83 6,48** 4,93** 3,62
(2,10) (3,08) (1,98) (2,31)
>20% Quality circles 3,22 3,24 3,42 3,10
(2,31) (3,44) (2,19) (2,02)
Strongly stimulates workers' participation 9,35*** 12,56*** 5,21*** 4,42
(1,98) (2,93) (1,90) (2,80)
Strike in 96-98 1,06 1,08 0,95 0,13
(2,17) (3,53) (2,25) (3,26)
Obs 1 070 1 027 1 060 885
Internet/Intranet 2,63*** 3,06*** 1,77** 1,91***
(1,00) (0,96) (0,76) (0,72)
>20% Quality circles 1,70 1,17 1,66** 0,42
(1,11) (1,02) (0,82) (0,69)
Strongly stimulates workers' participation 4,90*** 3,25*** 1,57** 2,06***
(1,02) (0,99) (0,76) (0,67)
Strike in 96-98 0,55 1,84* 0,48 1,95***
(1,00) (1,00) (0,82) (0,71)
Obs 1 068 1 017 1 056 883
D. Excess turnover
E. Number of trainees (per 100 workers)
F. Training hours per worker
 
Notes:      
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses 
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
(3) A separate OLS regression is run in each panel and for each occupational category. Each regression includes 
controls for plant size (dummy variable for plants with more than 200 employees), being located on a labour 
market whose density is higher than the median, multi-establishment firms, public sector companies, listed 
companies, presence of union delegates, share of women in the labour force, part-time work (dummy variable 
for firms with more than 5% of workers being part-time) and 15 sectors. 
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Table 3.1 
ICT Adoption and Skill Upgrading Channels in Manufacturing Sectors 
 
Managers and 
professionals
Technicians and 
supervisors Clerks Blue collars
Internet/Intranet 1,05*** -0,42 -0,20 -0,43
(0,26) (0,35) (0,26) (0,39)
Obs 641 641 641 641
Internet/Intranet 0,80*** -0,16 -0,11 -0,53
(0,23) (0,35) (0,25) (0,36)
Obs 641 641 641 641
Internet/Intranet 0,24 -0,15 -0,13 0,03
(0,19) (0,23) (0,17) (0,29)
Obs 641 641 641 641
Internet/Intranet -1,07 4,04 10,31** 8,99*
(1,33) (3,16) (4,27) (5,20)
Obs 635 634 634 634
Internet/Intranet 8,68*** 13,04*** 8,03*** 4,10**
(2,45) (4,48) (2,59) (1,94)
Obs 633 625 624 629
Internet/Intranet 4,67*** 4,40*** 3,69*** 1,85**
(1,27) (1,12) (1,07) (0,82)
Obs 631 620 622 629
D. Excess turnover
E. Number of trainees (per 100 workers)
F. Training hours per worker
A. Overall changes in the occupational structure
B. Internal movements
C. External movements
 
Notes:      
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses 
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
(3) A separate OLS regression is run in each panel and for each occupational category. Each 
regression includes controls for plant size (dummy variable for plants with more than 200 
employees), being located on a labour market whose density is higher than the median, multi-
establishment firms, public sector companies, listed companies, presence of union delegates, 
share of women in the labour force, part-time work (dummy variable for firms with more than 
5% of workers being part-time) and 7 manufacturing sub sectors. 
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Table 3.2 
ICT Adoption and Skill Upgrading Channels in Service Sectors 
 
Managers and 
professionals
Technicians and 
supervisors Clerks Blue collars
Interintra 1,07*** 0,40 -1,37** -0,10
(0,38) (0,52) (0,65) (0,63)
Obs 473 473 473 473
Interintra 0,70* 0,53 -1,25* 0,03
(0,38) (0,58) (0,67) (0,61)
Obs 473 473 473 473
Interintra 0,30 -0,34 0,04 -0,01
(0,30) (0,43) (0,43) (0,44)
Obs 473 473 473 473
Interintra 3,68 2,38 9,05 -32,38
(4,91) (4,52) (15,73) (33,71)
Obs 455 460 470 412
Interintra -3,65 -0,20 2,51 4,34
(3,59) (4,16) (3,03) (6,38)
Obs 464 427 463 280
Interintra 0,88 1,50 -0,27 2,93**
(1,51) (1,63) (1,04) (1,42)
Obs 464 422 461 278
D. Excess turnover
E. Number of trainees (per 100 workers)
F. Training hours per worker
A. Overall changes in the occupational structure
B. Internal movements
C. External movements
 
Notes:      
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses 
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
(3) A separate OLS regression is run in each panel and for each occupational category. Each 
regression includes controls for plant size (dummy variable for plants with more than 200 
employees), being located on a labour market whose density is higher than the median, multi-
establishment firms, public sector companies, listed companies, presence of union delegates, 
share of women in the labour force, part-time work (dummy variable for firms with more than 
5% of workers being part-time) and 8 service sub sectors. 
 
Table 4   
ICT Adoption and Skill Upgrading Channels:  
The role of size, labour market density and sector. 
 
Managers and 
professionals
Technicians and 
supervisors Clerks Blue collars
Internet/Intranet 0,45 1,01 -0,26 -1,20*
(0,51) (0,69) (0,64) (0,70)
Large -0,12 1,03*** -0,29 -0,62
(0,20) (0,30) (0,33) (0,40)
Internet/Intranet x Large -0,09 -0,89 0,99 -0,01
(0,49) (0,64) (0,63) (0,66)
High Density 0,25 -0,03 0,11 -0,33
(0,26) (0,40) (0,41) (0,47)
Internet/Intranet x High Density 0,65 -0,58 -1,15 1,08
(0,51) (0,68) (0,70) (0,71)
Services -0,46* -0,77** 0,32 0,91
(0,27) (0,39) (0,51) (0,57)
Internet/Intranet x Services 0,15 0,27 -0,88 0,46
(0,51) (0,63) (0,69) (0,70)
Hightech -0,20 0,18 0,71** -0,69
(0,33) (0,38) (0,35) (0,47)
Internet/Intranet x Hightech 0,77 -1,22* -0,72 1,17*
(0,54) (0,63) (0,61) (0,67)
Obs 1 069 1 069 1 069 1 069
Internet/Intranet 0,28 1,47** -0,72 -1,02
(0,46) (0,72) (0,61) (0,70)
Large -0,34 1,10*** -0,61* -0,16
(0,21) (0,32) (0,35) (0,37)
Internet/Intranet x Large 0,13 -1,14* 1,14* -0,13
(0,45) (0,67) (0,66) (0,65)
High Density 0,20 0,36 0,09 -0,65
(0,20) (0,41) (0,42) (0,47)
Internet/Intranet x High Density 0,89* -1,02 -1,06 1,19*
(0,47) (0,74) (0,74) (0,71)
Services -0,27 -0,46 -0,09 0,82
(0,29) (0,42) (0,50) (0,53)
Internet/Intranet x Services -0,23 0,27 -0,67 0,64
(0,44) (0,67) (0,69) (0,67)
Hightech -0,21 0,42 0,22 -0,43
(0,31) (0,40) (0,34) (0,42)
Internet/Intranet x Hightech 0,32 -1,12* -0,12 0,92
(0,46) (0,65) (0,61) (0,63)
Obs 1 069 1 069 1 069 1 069
A. Overall changes in the occupational structure
B. Internal movements
 
 
(…) 
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Table 4 – follow (1) 
 
 
Managers and 
professionals
Technicians and 
supervisors Clerks Blue collars  
 
Internet/Intranet 0,03 -0,32 0,62 -0,33
(0,38) (0,53) (0,43) (0,55)
Large 0,16 -0,09 0,41* -0,48
(0,16) (0,23) (0,23) (0,30)
Internet/Intranet x Large -0,04 0,11 -0,34 0,27
(0,35) (0,47) (0,41) (0,50)
High Density 0,06 -0,24 0,30 -0,12
(0,23) (0,29) (0,29) (0,39)
Internet/Intranet x High Density -0,16 0,23 -0,25 0,18
(0,42) (0,52) (0,45) (0,53)
Services -0,10 -0,20 0,12 0,18
(0,22) (0,32) (0,31) (0,37)
Internet/Intranet x Services 0,31 -0,13 -0,04 -0,14
(0,42) (0,50) (0,49) (0,55)
Hightech 0,04 -0,25 0,40 -0,19
(0,25) (0,27) (0,29) (0,40)
Internet/Intranet x Hightech 0,44 -0,01 -0,66 0,23
(0,40) (0,45) (0,43) (0,53)
Obs 1 069 1 069 1 069 1 069
Internet/Intranet -1,84 1,38 -6,50 42,14*
(4,11) (9,41) (14,16) (24,06)
Large -0,10 -12,14* -22,73** 20,44
(4,28) (7,04) (8,97) (35,89)
Internet/Intranet x Large -1,19 2,69 20,22 -49,99
(4,51) (7,45) (15,98) (38,67)
High Density -3,47 -10,77** -16,44* -29,46
(4,32) (5,05) (9,64) (22,23)
Internet/Intranet x High Density 3,72 12,13** 43,37** 32,26
(5,53) (5,53) (21,76) (22,83)
Services 14,25** 19,60*** 63,60*** 49,40*
(5,70) (5,45) (9,84) (26,43)
Internet/Intranet x Services 3,55 -8,65 -18,48 -55,77*
(4,92) (7,11) (14,73) (30,87)
Hightech 1,18 1,10 0,61 -17,53**
(2,34) (2,57) (5,72) (7,95)
Internet/Intranet x Hightech 1,96 -2,74 -2,81 -2,98
(3,19) (5,17) (13,32) (16,68)
Obs 1 045 1 049 1 059 1 005
D. Excess turnover
C. External movements
 
 
(…) 
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Table 4 – follow (2) 
 
Managers and 
professionals
Technicians and 
supervisors Clerks Blue collars  
 
Internet/Intranet 12,13** 8,03 9,26* 3,76
(5,04) (5,53) (4,90) (4,50)
Large 12,36*** 15,48*** 8,53*** 9,04*
(2,78) (3,55) (2,59) (4,62)
Internet/Intranet x Large -5,27 -4,76 -2,50 -2,54
(4,36) (5,30) (4,32) (5,51)
High Density -1,75 -1,45 -1,93 -0,17
(3,22) (3,91) (2,81) (3,76)
Internet/Intranet x High Density 2,39 3,98 0,98 -0,65
(4,56) (5,50) (4,41) (4,94)
Services 4,52 2,80 -2,14 8,18
(3,62) (4,40) (3,51) (5,82)
Internet/Intranet x Services -16,02*** -7,73 -4,81 -3,00
(4,94) (5,91) (5,15) (5,81)
Hightech -5,26 -5,42 1,95 3,59
(3,51) (4,70) (3,49) (2,58)
Internet/Intranet x Hightech 1,26 2,69 -1,97 2,39
(4,27) (5,20) (4,96) (3,99)
Obs 1 052 1 009 1 043 871
Internet/Intranet 6,09** 2,91 3,79** -1,19
(2,47) (2,03) (1,74) (1,57)
Large 6,73*** 5,40*** 3,59*** 2,14***
(1,33) (1,25) (0,91) (0,74)
Internet/Intranet x Large -1,91 -0,20 -1,52 2,07
(2,13) (2,06) (1,72) (1,47)
High Density 0,32 0,28 0,82 0,18
(1,37) (1,34) (1,17) (0,85)
Internet/Intranet x High Density -1,40 -0,32 -1,87 0,33
(2,12) (2,18) (1,67) (1,84)
Services 1,03 2,51* 1,45 0,06
(1,49) (1,44) (1,18) (1,19)
Internet/Intranet x Services -4,44* -2,01 -2,88* 2,35
(2,34) (2,14) (1,73) (1,90)
Hightech 1,32 1,94 2,34* -0,56
(1,62) (1,33) (1,24) (1,08)
Internet/Intranet x Hightech 0,63 3,63* 1,54 2,80*
(2,14) (1,95) (1,85) (1,62)
Obs 1 051 1 001 1 040 869
F. Training hours per worker
E. Number of trainees (per 100 workers)
 
Notes:  (1) Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
(2) A separate OLS regression is run in each panel and for each occupational category. Each 
regression includes controls for plant size (dummy variable for plants with more than 200 
employees), multi-establishment firms, public sector companies, listed companies, presence of 
union delegates, share of women in the labour force, part-time work (dummy variable for firms 
with more than 5% of workers being part-time) and 15 sectors. 
(3) High Density indicates that local labour market density belongs to the highest quartile. 
(3) The coefficient for "Services" is computed as the difference between the coefficients for the 
eight 2-digit service sub sectors and the seven 2-digit manufacturing sub sectors, weighted by the 
shares of each sub sector. 
(4) The "Hightech" indicator uses the OECD definition, applied to 712 4-digit sub sectors. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table A.1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
All plants
Internet/Intranet
=0
Internet/Intranet
=1 Manufacturing Services
Change of labor share (in %)
Managers and professionals 0,77 0,33 1,65 0,93 0,54
Technicians and supervisors 0,56 0,63 0,44 0,72 0,36
Clerks -0,38 -0,15 -0,84 -0,27 -0,53
Blue collars -0,95 -0,81 -1,24 -1,38 -0,37
Change of labor share through internal movements (in %)
Managers and professionals 0,92 0,60 1,55 0,90 0,93
Technicians and supervisors 0,79 0,73 0,92 0,96 0,56
Clerks -0,64 -0,38 -1,16 -0,41 -0,95
Blue collars -1,07 -0,95 -1,31 -1,46 -0,55
Change of labor share through entries and exits (in %)
Managers and professionals -0,07 -0,18 0,15 0,07 -0,26
Technicians and supervisors -0,13 0,00 -0,41 -0,17 -0,09
Clerks 0,18 0,13 0,29 0,14 0,25
Blue collars 0,02 0,04 -0,02 -0,04 0,10
Excess turnover (in %)
Managers and professionals 24,12 25,04 22,29 18,54 31,89
Technicians and supervisors 25,13 27,38 20,67 13,95 40,55
Clerks 61,10 61,07 61,16 30,13 102,88
Blue collars 49,93 53,38 42,79 27,21 84,89
Number of trainees per 100 workers
Managers and professionals 59,60 56,71 65,38 60,58 58,27
Technicians and supervisors 59,59 55,47 67,94 60,94 57,62
Clerks 41,27 37,88 48,06 43,82 37,83
Blue collars 34,18 32,04 39,14 34,17 34,22
Hours of training per worker
Managers and professionals 21,45 19,54 25,24 22,70 19,75
Technicians and supervisors 19,45 17,55 23,30 19,97 18,69
Clerks 12,07 10,87 14,47 13,08 10,70
Blue collars 9,49 8,27 12,31 10,31 7,63
Internet/Intranet 0,33 0,00 1,00 0,34 0,32
>20% Quality circles 0,28 0,26 0,33 0,34 0,20
Strongly stimulates workers' participation 0,35 0,31 0,44 0,40 0,29
Strike in 96-98 0,35 0,34 0,38 0,46 0,21
Indicator for plant with more than 200 workers 0,53 0,48 0,62 0,62 0,40
Indicator for dense local labor market 0,25 0,21 0,34 0,20 0,32
Indicator for service sector 0,42 0,43 0,41 0,00 1,00
Indicator for multi-establishment firm 0,60 0,57 0,66 0,63 0,56
Indicator for public sector 0,03 0,03 0,05 0,02 0,05
Indicator for listed company 0,43 0,38 0,54 0,55 0,27
Indicator for presence of union delegates 0,77 0,76 0,81 0,84 0,69
Share of women (%) 35,13 35,91 33,54 25,98 47,53
Indicator for part-time work (>5% of workforce) 0,37 0,37 0,38 0,22 0,58
Number of observations 1114 747 367 641 473
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Table A.2   
ICT Adoption and Training 
(controls for lagged training included) 
 
Managers and 
professionals
Technicians and 
supervisors Clerks Blue collars
 
Internet/Intranet 1,78 5,57* 4,99*** 2,05
(1,85) (3,30) (1,76) (2,10)
Obs 1 005 938 995 828
Internet/Intranet 1,66* 2,22** 1,70** 0,74
(0,91) (0,87) (0,71) (0,60)
Obs 1 001 924 990 824
E. Number of trainees (per 100 workers)
F. Training hours per worker
1. All firms
 
Internet/Intranet 6,36*** 9,76** 8,44*** 2,64
(2,21) (4,85) (2,27) (1,73)
Obs 589 576 577 582
Internet/Intranet 3,19*** 2,91*** 3,86*** 0,57
(1,15) (1,08) (0,98) (0,71)
Obs 585 567 575 582
E. Number of trainees (per 100 workers)
F. Training hours per worker
2. Manufacturing Sector only
 
Internet/Intranet -4,52 -0,37 0,71 1,41
(3,24) (4,15) (2,83) (6,14)
Obs 416 362 418 246
Internet/Intranet -0,26 1,13 -1,40 1,03
(1,46) (1,52) (0,98) (1,14)
Obs 416 357 415 242
E. Number of trainees (per 100 workers)
F. Training hours per worker
3. Service Sectors only
 
Notes: (1) Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
(2) A separate OLS regression is run in each panel and for each occupational category. 
Each regression includes controls for plant size, being located on a labour market whose 
density is higher than the median, multi-establishment firms, public sector companies, listed 
companies, presence of union delegates, share of women in the labour force, part-time 
work. All panels include industry dummies (15 in Panel 1, 7 in Panel 2 and 8 in Panel 3). 
Panel E controls for the average proportion of trainees among workers in 1993-1995 and 
Panel F for the number of training hours per worker in 1993-1995. 
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Table A.3   
ICT Adoption and Skill Upgrading Channels  
Alternative indicators of ICT 
(Internet/Intranet = at least 20% of workers using the Internet and at least 50% using the Intranet) 
 
Managers and 
professionals
Technicians and 
supervisors Clerks Blue collars
Internet/Intranet 1,84*** -0,14 -1,23*** -0,48
(0,35) (0,42) (0,44) (0,44)
Obs 1 114 1 114 1 114 1 114
Internet/Intranet 1,54*** -0,02 -1,21*** -0,32
(0,32) (0,46) (0,45) (0,44)
Obs 1 114 1 114 1 114 1 114
Internet/Intranet 0,25 -0,15 0,03 -0,13
(0,24) (0,30) (0,27) (0,32)
Obs 1 114 1 114 1 114 1 114
Internet/Intranet 1,23 1,70 12,37 -10,25
(2,29) (2,60) (11,12) (13,94)
Obs 1 090 1 094 1 104 1 046
Internet/Intranet 3,17 9,78** 7,41*** 6,57*
(2,54) (4,77) (2,45) (3,82)
Obs 1 097 1 052 1 087 909
Internet/Intranet 2,09* 3,00** 1,54* 1,83*
(1,16) (1,20) (0,87) (1,05)
Obs 1 095 1 042 1 083 907
D. Excess turnover
E. Number of trainees (per 100 workers)
F. Training hours per worker
A. Overall changes in the occupational structure
B. Internal movements
C. External movements
 
Notes:      
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses 
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
(3) A separate OLS regression is run in each panel and for each occupational category. Each 
regression includes controls for plant size (dummy variable for plants with more than 200 
employees), being located on a labour market whose density is higher than the median, multi 
establish-ment firms, public sector companies, listed companies, presence of union delegates, 
share of women in the labour force, part-time work (dummy variable for firms with more than 
5% of workers being part-time) and 15 sectors. 
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Data appendix 
 
 
In this appendix, we detail the key steps taken in preparing the data. The data sources are 
described in the data section in the text. In addition, the data on local labour market 
density (the number of employed and unemployed workers per square kilometres, 
computed over 348 local labour markets) comes from the 1990 population census. 
 
Merging the different datasets 
 
We start from a sample of 2,975 plants from the REPONSE (1998) survey, with 
information on ICT adoption as well as key firm and plant characteristics. Matching the 
RESPONSE sample with the DMMO-EMMO, ESE and 24-83 sources hence yields a 
sample of 1537 plants. 
The relatively low matching rate (53%) is due, in particular, to the fact that the EMMO is 
not an exhaustive data source (plants are sampled at a rate that depends on their size) and 
that the 24-83 fiscal forms are not systematically coded.  
In order to achieve this matching rate, we extrapolate some of the missing data, using the 
following procedures: 
- when a plant is only present for 1 (resp. 2) of the 3 years in the 24-83 database, 
we compute the training variables as averages over 1 (resp. 2) years instead of 3; 
- when a plant is missing for some quarters in a given year in the EMMO-DMMO 
data, we extrapolate the entries and exits in each occupation from the entries and 
exits observed during the rest of the year; if a plant is missing during one (or two) 
of the three years, we extrapolate entries and exits from the other years. 
Though these extrapolations introduce measurement error in the movement and training 
variables, this does not bias the estimates as these are dependent variables in the 
regressions (it might, however, make them less precise). Moreover, we checked that 
restricting the sample to those plants that have complete DMMO-EMMO information 
does not significantly alter the results. Our results are indeed a little less precise when 
using extrapolated information. The point estimates are generally a bit smaller, but not 
significantly.  
 
Outliers and consistency checks 
It appeared that for some of the plants, the training information had been misreported 
(possibly inverted) for skilled and unskilled blue collars in 1997 and 1998, leading to 
implausible training rates. As we lacked information to correct the errors, we decided to 
aggregate the two categories in a single blue-collar occupation. In addition to this, a few 
observations had outlying values for the number of trainees for some years. We corrected 
these observations when possible, or set them to missing. 
 
We then performed several consistency checks on this 1537 plant sample. First, we 
checked that the total plant size declared in the ESE does not differ too much from the 
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one declared in the DMMO-EMMO sources, at the beginning and at the end of our period 
(Dec 31, 1995 and Dec 31, 1998). We drop all plants for which the difference is more 
than 20% or represents at least 10 workers. We tested the robustness of our results to 
other thresholds; the main findings are not affected.  
Second, we checked for outliers in the changes in the occupational structure. We dropped 
plants for which the sum of the absolute changes in the share of the different occupations 
is more than 60% and represents more than 10 workers. The results are not sensitive to 
using a stricter threshold. 
With these filters, the benchmark sample has 1,114 plants. Dropping any kind of filter 
and using the 1537 observations does not significantly impact our results on training, but 
does affect those concerning internal and external movements. However, once a 
minimum level of consistency across data sources is required, the tightness of the filters 
we used does not matter. 
Last, we also considered a sample where we restricted upward internal mobility for 
managers and professionals and downward internal mobility for unskilled blue collars. 
The idea is that managers cannot be downgraded and that no one can be promoted to an 
unskilled blue collar position. We first consider a strict limit, but as it appears that the 
median of internal promotion for unskilled workers was 0 (though obviously not 
symmetrically distributed), we eventually settle to a less strict limit (+/-2) allowing for 
measurement errors (in the first case the sample contains about 550 observations, and 
about 950 in the second case). When using the strict rule, results do shift a bit, but the 
sample size is also divided by 2. However, when using the less strict rule of +/-2, results 
are in line with our benchmark.  
 
 
 
 
 
